Local and international media reports, citing unnamed Pakistani
officials, carried typical details: swarms of American drones had
swooped into remote areas, killing up to nine people, including two
senior commanders of Al Qaeda.
In Islamabad, Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry lodged an official protest
with the American Embassy.
Yet there was one problem, according to three American officials with
knowledge of the program: The United States did not carry out those
attacks.
“They were not ours,” said one of the officials, speaking on the
condition of anonymity because of the drone program’s secrecy. “We
haven’t had any kinetic activity since January.”
What exactly took place in those remote tribal villages, far from
outside scrutiny, is unclear. But the Americans’ best guess is that one
or possibly both of the strikes were carried out by the Pakistani
military and falsely attributed to the C.I.A. to avoid criticism from
the Pakistani public.
E-mail and phone messages seeking comment from the Pakistani military
were not returned.
If the American version is true, it is a striking irony: In the early
years of the drone campaign, the Pakistani Army falsely claimed
responsibility for American drone strikes in an attempt to mask C.I.A.
activities on its soil. Now, the Americans suggest, the Pakistani
military may be using the same program to disguise its own operations.
More broadly, the phantom attacks underscore the longstanding difficulty
of gaining reliable information about America’s drone program in the
remote and largely inaccessible tribal belt — particularly at a time
when the program is under sharp scrutiny in Washington.
For the past month, John O. Brennan, President Obama’s counterterrorism
adviser and nominee to lead the C.I.A., has been dogged by Congressional
questions about the drone program’s lack of transparency, particularly
when it comes to killing American citizens abroad.
The biggest obstacle to confirming details of the strikes is their
location: the strikes usually hit remote, hostile and virtually
closed-off areas. Foreign reporters are barred from the tribal belt, and
the handful of local journalists who operate there find themselves
vulnerable to pressure from both the military and the Taliban.
That murkiness has often suited the purposes of both the C.I.A. and the
Pakistani military. It allows the Americans to conduct drone strikes
behind a curtain of secrecy, largely shielded from public oversight and
outside scrutiny. For the Pakistanis, it allows them to play both sides:
publicly condemning strikes, while quietly supporting others, like the
missile attack that killed
the Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud in 2009.
Still, the information vacuum also places American officials at a
disadvantage when it comes to answering accusations that the drone
strikes kill large numbers of innocent civilians alongside bona fide
militants. State Department officials have complained that they cannot
effectively counter civilian death claims they believe are hugely
inflated because the program is classified — a subject of lively debate
inside the administration, one official said.
The private controversy over the latest strikes, however, suggested
another phenomenon at work: the manipulation of the actual drone reports
themselves.
The two strikes, which took place on Feb. 6 in North Waziristan and Feb.
8 in South Waziristan, went unremarked on largely because they appeared
so run of the mill.
Small Pakistani news agencies and international television networks,
including NBC and Al Jazeera, carried common-sounding details: accounts
of multiple American drones hovering overhead, estimates of the number
of missiles fired, accounts of the rescue effort by local civilians and
quotes from Pakistani military officials in the tribal belt or nearby
Peshawar.
“The compound was completely destroyed. The militants had surrounded the
area after the attack,” one official told Agence France-Presse after
the second explosion, in Babar Ghar, near Ladha, in South Waziristan.
Some reports, attributed to Pakistani officials, said the dead included
two Qaeda commanders, identified as Abu Majid al-Iraqi and Sheikh Abu
Waqas. Other reports said four Uzbek militants had died.
“The Pakistan Air Force does not generally undertake stand-alone strikes
such as these because it is not equipped with the appropriate strike
weapons,” a Pakistani military source said.
The American narrative of those strikes is very different.
Two senior United States officials said there had been no American
involvement in the attacks. A third official said the C.I.A. had not
paid the reports much attention because no American forces had been
involved. But that official said American intelligence pointed to the
Pakistan Air Force as having conducted the first strike, probably as
part of a military operation against Pakistani Taliban militants in the
neighboring Orakzai tribal agency.
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